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A. No. 2i)048.

In Bank.

:\ov.

ELLA S. LAIHD, Respondent, v. 'I'. \V. JI.!IA'l'HEH, INC.
Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Negligence-Duty Towa-rds Business Invitees.-A Rtorc owmer
owes to
business invitee the duty to excmoise ordinary care
to keep its premises in a re~sonahly safe condition or to
wa
of latent or concealed dangers of which it knows or
should know in the exereise of reasonable care.
[2] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Ordinary Care.--~What constitutes "ordinary eare" under the facts is usually a question
for the jury, which must view the conduct ns a whole in the
light of the circumstances.
[3] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Exercise of Care.-In the
absence of legislatively or judicially declared standards,
whether or not the conduct of a party conformed to that of a
"reasonably prudent man," the standard usually applied, is a
question left to the jury's detPrmination when different conclusions may rensorwbly be drawn from the evidoncP.
[4] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Negligence of Defendant:
Evidence-Sufficieney.-In an action for injuries sustained by
a 79-year-old department store patron who fell on the bottom
step of a stairway leading to the basement of the store,
whether defendant failed to keep its premises in a reasonably
safe condition was properly left to the jury, and the jury
could reasonably conclude that by ending a handrail, which
started at the top of the stairway, short of the bottom step,
defendant created an unreasonable risk of danger on the
grounds that it could rPasonably have been foreseen that the
customers, a large number of whom were elderly persons,
would assume that the handrail would continue the full length
of the stnirway, that their attention would be distracted by the
display of wnres oi"fered for snle in the basement, that they
~would be preoccupied with the possibility of making purchases,
aiHl that they would rely on the handrail to help them safely
to the basement.

1] 8Pe Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 108 et seq.; Am.Jur., 1'\egli131 et seq.
I\L•K. Dig. References:
~ 76; [2, :J] 1\egligcnce,
6] 1\ cglig·enee, ~ l4; [7]
:-<,•gligellcP, 3147;
Neglig('llet', §-13; [D, 10] \Vibwsses, §136;
[11] Evidence, ~~ liJG(3), 1iJG
; [12] EvidPmc, ~ 1;')()('1); [13]
l•;vidPIJCP, ~ 90;
Negligence, § 191;
N cgligence, § 209;
[1GJ 1\egligen<:e, § :2q(i,
't

; <·: •· ·, ~j
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[5] !d.-Contributory Negligence-Excuses for Failure to Avoid
Injury. -In nn aetion for
sustained by a 79-year-old
store patron who fell on the bottom step of a
stairway !earling to the basement of the ston', it does not
necessarily follow from the fact that plaintiff mi~;·ht have seen
the last step had she looked that she was contrihutinlly neg-lig-ent as watter of la\Y; all of the circumstances must he taken
iuto account, 11nd where there is some reasonable excuse for
failure to observe an obvious
the conduct may be
exeused.
[6] !d.-Contributory Negligence-Excuses for Failure to Avoid
Injm:y.-Althongh a person may be charged, as a matter of
law, with
that there are pitfalls to be avoided on a
public
it is not necessarily neg-ligent to fail to watch
for
:t businc>ss cstahlishmPnt when the ordinarily
prudent pPrson would not in fact expect the condition where
it is, or where he is likely to have his attention distracted
us he approaches it.
[7] !d.-Evidence-Contributory Negligence.--In an action for
injuries sustained by a 79-year-old department store patron
who fell ou the bottom step of a stairway leading to the basement of the store, it could not be said as a matter of law that
pluintifr did not usc the degree of care that should have been
exercised by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances where the jury could reasonably conclude that
plaintiff could safely assume that a handrail, which started at
the top of the stairway, would not terminate before the bottom
of the stairway was reached.
[8] !d.-Contributory Negligence-Care in Discovery and Avoidance of Danger.--Contributory negligence is not imputable to
a plaintiff for ftliling to look out for a danger which he had
no reasonable cause to apprehend, or to a plaintiff who was
deceived by appeanmces calculated to deceive an ordinarily
prudent person.
[9] Witnesses-Cross-examination-Matters Bearing on Credibility.--Although the cross-examination of a witness should ordinarily be confined to matters that have been testified to by the
~witness on direct examination, latitude is permitted to test
accuracy or credibility, and the trial court is gi \'Cn a wide
discretion in eontrolling cross-examination affecting the knowledge and credibility of an expert witness.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Xegligcnce, §§ 210,220 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 174 ct seq~
[9] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 78; Am.Jur., Witnesses, §§ 625,
630.

or Injuries.-Before
be admitted on the issue
fact
that the c:onditions under
the same
but the strictis "much relaxed" wtwn the purpo~e
to show notice.
Accidents or Injuries.-In an action
79-year-old
~tore patron
to the baseto prove
the stairway was
that defendant
knew or should have known that it was, testimony of a former
defendant that he had been informed that someone
on the stairs and that extensions should
which stmtecl at the top of the
was relevant
but to show
the

[13]

lU

be
[14] Negligence-Instructions-Exercise of Care-Presumptions.of due care may
under certain circumstances, an instruction
on the
should not be given when the party who
seeks to invoke it testifies
his conduct immediately
to or at the time in question.
[15] Id.- Instructions- Contributory Negligence- Exercise of
Care-Presumptions.-In an action for injuries sustained by
a
store patron who fell on the bottom
step of a
leading to the basement of the store, where
testified to her conduct immediately prior to or at the
time of her fall, there was no room for any presumption of
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due care, and it was error to instruct the

on such pre-

[16] Id.- Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions-Contributory
Negligence.-In an action for injuries su~tained
a
old
store patron who fell on the bottom
to the basement of the

time of her
sented the jury eould
either wny on the vital issue
gence, the
of the instruction added
tiff's contention that she was
with due care for her own
and thus overemphasiL~cd her claim in the minds of the
and dPfendant was thereby forced to overcome
a
preponderance of evidence, not
ease that she
was :free from eontrilmtory
tion that she was acting with due care.

APPEAL from a j ndgment of the Superior Court of I.~os
Angeles County and from au order denying motion for
ment notwithstanding the verdict. John Gee Clark, Judge.
Heversed.
Action for damages for injuries sustained by patron of
store as resnlt of fall on bottom step of stairway leading to
basement of store. J udgnH'nt for plaintiff reversed.
Moss, Lyon & Dnnn,
for Appellant.

A. Moss and Henry F. ·walker

Adams, Duque & Hazeltine and James S. Cline for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-While descending the
ment of defendant's store, plaintiff, a
·whose health and
·were
fell
aud suffered a broken hip.
taken from the basement
on next
) shows t lw st
the aecident exeept that in
was a rail on eaeh side of lhe stainrdl
the
the hraekets appear. 'l'he handrail tcl'minated
a
and a halt' sbort of ilw fnll
tlw
this action for
testified that sl1c nscd
handrail for support, that wllcn ''he reac-hed the rnd of the
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handrail she assumed that she had reached the bottom of the
stairs, and that she then stepped forward and fell. At the
trial, which was held four years after the accident, she testified at olle time that she could not remember where she was
looking when she fell and at another time that she was looking out into the lighted basement. Wares were on display in
the basement in front of the stairs. Plaintiff testified that
she did not recall looking at any particular display, but defendant's traffic manager testified that after the accident

pla iutiff st at<•d
r·handise in [ront of ih(• stainn1y. 'fherc was
least fJO per eent of the eustomer-s visit

department store ·were over 65-70 years oi age,
ant had notiee of the eom1ition of the
, and that extensions for the haudra il had lJeen ordered but had not lJeell
installed
the time of tb" aceident. Two witHesse:s testified
for defendant that the stainnty did not Yiolate the Pasadena
Buildi11g Code and that it was collstrncted according to
''standard ellgineering praetiee.''
'rhe jury returned a verdict in fayor of plai11tiff for
$9,:'540.18. Motions for a direeted verdiet, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial were denied. Defendant appeals from the judgment entered on the Yerdict
and from the order denying its motion for jndg·mcnt notwithstanding the verdiet, elaiming that the evidence was insufficient to establish liability and that certain rul ing·s on
admission of eYidence and insiructiom; to the jury were prejudicially erroneous.

I. Sufficiency of the EL'idcncc to Support the Verdict
[1] It is coneeded that the plaintiff \Yas a business invitee
at the time of the accident. Defendant >ras therefore obliged
to exercise ordinary eare to keep its premises in a reasonably
safe eonditiou or to give warning of latent or toneealecl
dangers of wl1ieh it knew or should have known in the exercise
of reasonable care. (Blumberg v. JJI. cCc 'T. Inc., 34 CaL2d 226,
229 [20D P.2c1 1]; Blodgett v. B. II. Dyas. 4 CaL2cl 511, 512
[50 P .2d 801 J ; see 2 Rest., 'forts, § 34B.) Defendant contends
that its motion for jndgmcnt notwithstanding the verdict
should have been granted 011 the grounds that the cvidenee
discloses as a matter of law that it exrn:ised the required
degree of care in the maintenanee of its prrmif>es and tllat the
plaintiff failed to exereise ordinary eare for her own safety.
[2] ·what constitutes "ordinary eare" under the faet.s
of any particular ease is usually a question for the jury, whieh
must view the conduet as a whole in the light of all the circumstances. (3] Thus, it is common practice for the jury
to determine the standard of conduct to be applied within
the compass of the broad rule that the preseribed conduet
must conform to that of a ''reasonably prndent man under
the circumstances." (See Peri v. Los Angeles Junction Ry.
Co., 22 CaL2d lll, 120-121 1137 P.2d 441]; Clinkscales v.
Can;cr, 22 CaL2d 72, 75-76 [136 P.2d 777].) In the absence

dc·ter;Jl i11atiOJl

whether or not
a
safe
Defendant's enspersons. The jury
conelude that by ending the handrail short
of the stairway, defendant created an unreasonable risk of danger, on the grounds that it could
haYe been foreseen that the customers would asthe handrail would continue the full
of the
that their attc>ntion would be distraeted by the
of wares offered for sale in the
that they
would be
with the possibility of making pur1 and that they vvould rely on the handrail to help
to the basement.
Defendant cites several decisions for the proposition that
it is not liable as a matter of law. In Holmes v. Mocsser, 120
Cal.App.2d 612
P.2d 27], the plaintiff fell on stairs that
did not have a handrail even though a statute re-quired that
one be
In affirming a
of nonsuit, the
court held that the absence of a handrail is not ac.tionable
1
'l'he trial court instruded the jury that: "Yon may consider the
fact that the attention of
who visit public stores ordinarily is
attraeterl
the dispby
wares offered for sale ;md may he more or
less
by the transaction which
have in mind. You may
c-onsider whether the doferrdant
that fact with ordinary
care in the exercise of the
which
defined; also whether the
plaintifr dicl or did not shaTe
ort1inary experience of store visitors,
anrl if so, "What effcet that faet had upon her conduct in relation to
the cause
the aeeldcnt." Defendant contends tbnt it was
error to so instruct
on the ground that the
is
unsupported
the
The eont~ntion is without merit.
testify that
eould not Tecall thnt her attenbeen distracted
partieular
thPro was evidence
direet]y in
of the stair1vay;
she >Vns looking ont into the lighted
tho defendant's traffic
testified that plaintiff
before she fell
at the merchandise
out in tho open in front of
stairwell." 'l'hc
thnt there was
merchandise on display in the
of the stairwell is relevant
to the issue of the
of accidents from the use of the
handrail.
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nttention whattllrough
\Yith the knowledge
to basements of
mere an tile
'rherc JS no duty to give any
of the presence of a stairway and
eyes to proir<et thrmsclycs from such
(Cit:cttions.)"
Cal.2d at pp. 512-513.)
Def,·JH1ant vcmtends that in the
plaintiff
l1aYc
herself '
hPr
not follow from the fact that plaintiff
lookrd that she was
All of the cirand where there is
to observe an obvious
.Althongh a person
of law, with the knowledge that
avoided on a pnblic
it is not
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necessarily negligent to fail to watch for dangers in a business
establishment wl1en the ordinarily prudent person would not
in fact expect to find the condition where it is, or where he is
likely to have his attention distracted as he approaches it.
(See Harper & James, The Law of 'l'orts 1491-1493; Prosser,
Torts, 2d ed., 459-460.) Tlwre arc many cases involving accidents in mercantile establishments where the question of
plaintiff's contributory negligence has been held to be a
question for the jury even though the plaintiff failed to
observe what may have been an obvious danger. For example,
in Walsh v. JJ[auricc Mercantile Co., 20 Cal.App.2d 45 [66
P.2d 181], the plaintiff tripped and fell over a seale that protruded into the aisle of defendant's store. The court stated:
''Conceding that if the plaintiff had looked she might have
seen the scale, nevertheless in the circumstances she was reasonably justified in assuming that the aisle was unobstructed,
and her failure to see it was not necessarily negligence. Different inferences might be drawn from the evidence ... the question was one for the jury." (See also Blumberg v. M. & T.
Inc., 34 Cal.2d 226 [209 P.2d 1] [clearly visible opening in rug
mat]; Nccl v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647 [122 P.2d 576]
[projection extending over the end of a stairway] ; Ratt v.
Redwood City Woman's Clnb, 111 Cal.App.2d 546 [245 P.2d
12] [worn and slippery stairs]; Locke v. Red River Lbr. Co.,
65 Cal.App.2d 322 [150 P.2d 506] [plainly visible crack in
concrete floor].) [7] In the present ease we cannot say
that as a matter of law plaintiff did not use the degree of
care that should have been exercised by a reasonably prudent
person under similar eireumstanecs. 'l'he jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff could safely assume that the handrail would not terminate before the bottom of the stairway
was reached. [8] ''Contributory negligence is not imputable to a plaintiff for failing to look out for a danger which
he had no reasonable eanse to apprehend, or to a plaintiff who
was deceiYCd by appearances calculated to deceive an ordinarily prudent person." (Brandenbtu·g v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 28 Cal.2d 282, 287 [169 P.2d 909].) There was therefore
no error in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
II. Scope of Ct·oss-Examination of Defendant's
Expert Witness
Thomas C. Shields, a construction engineer presented by
defendant as an expert witness, testified on direct examination
that in his opinion the stairway conformed to ''standard

Nov.
engineering practiee" in the city of Pasadena. On crossexamination plaintiff's counsel asked whether he limited his
answers to standard engineering practice in Pasadena, to
which the witness replied "No," volunteering that: "That
would also be [true] anywhere in the world, so far as I am
concerned." The witness was then asked, over objection,
whether the stairway would conform to proper practice in
''all of Los Angeles,'' to which he replied, ''Yes.'' On further
cross-examination counsel interrogated him on his familiarity
with the Los Angeles Building Code and the witness read
from the code certain provisions dealing with the requirement of handrails. Defendant contends that facts concerning
the building code were irrelevant to the present inquiry, that
they were not brought out on direct examination, and that it
was therefore improper to permit this course of cross-examination. Plaintiff contends that when the witness voluntarily
stated that in his expert opinion the stairway conformed to
standard engineering practice "everywhere in the world" including Los Angeles, plaintiff could test his credibility by
showing that this statement could not possibly be true.
[9] Although the cross-examination of a witness should
ordinarily be confined to matters that have been testified to by
the witness on direct examination, latitude is permitted to
test accuracy or credibility (Newman v. Los Angeles Tr·ansit
Lines, 120 Cal.App.2d 685, 691 [262 P.2d 95]; Wigmore,
Evidence, § 1006; McCormick, Evidence, § 22), and the trial
court is given a wide discretion in coutrolling cross-examination affecting the knowledge and credibility of an expert
witness. (Laguna Salada, etc. School Dist. v. Pacific Development Co., 119 Cal.App.2d 470 [259 P.2d 498].) [10] In
the present case defendant's witness offered his expert opinion
as to the safe construction of the stairway ''anywhere in the
world." rrhe trial court did not err in permitting the plaintiff
to inquire into the basis for this opinion nor to counter the
effect of the witness's broad statement by attempting to show
that it was not correct. ( Cf. People v. W estelc, 31 Cal.2d
469,476 [190 P.2d 9] .)

III. Admissibility of Evidence of Previous Injuries
Over objection by defendant, George Falk, a former employee of defendant, was permitted to testify that before the
accident he had told Mr. Kalik, defendant's vice-president,
that: ''we should do something about that rail because I had
heard from one of the employees-! don't remember who it

fore relevant and
llot to show that
fell, but to show defendant's
of
condition of the stairway. Insofar as
17 Cal.App.2d 401
P.2d
,
the principle that it is proper to admit
injuries that reasonably tends to show that the
knew or should have known of the
tion that caused the injury in

2

2
In that case the court upheld a ruling sustaining the objection to
counsel's questions as to whether or not other women had previously
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testified
as
the trial
the
ac-

P.2d
648 [226

l255
Southern Pacific R.R. Co.,
; N uuncmakcr v.
; Swanson v. Bogatin, 149
8] ;
v.
& County
419 [322 P.2d 623] .)
testified to her conduct

limiter1
accident occurred.
the fact that
to tll()
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[16] The question remains whether the error was prejudicial. In Bntigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal.2d 652, 660661 [~l20 P.2d 500], it is stated that:
'''!'he determination ·whether, in a specific instance, the
probable cf'fed of the instruction has been to mislead the jury,
and \vhrther the error· has been prejudicial so all to require
reversal deprndR on ali the circumstances of the case, including the evidencE', and the other instructions given. No preeiRe formula can be drawn.''
In that ease, the giving of an instruction on unavoidable
accident 1vas held to constitute reversible error because it
tended to overemphasize d0fendant's case. From the evidence
presented in the present case the jury could reasollably have
drawu the infcrenc0 either way on the vital issue of plaintiff's
eontributory negligener. 'l'he giving of the instruction obviousl.v added strength to the plaintiff's contention that she
was acting \Yith due care for her own safety, and thus overemphasized her claim in the minds of the jury. The defendant was thereby forcrd to overcome hy a preponderance
of the eyidenec, not only plaintiff's case that she was free from
eoni.rihutory negligence•, but also the presumption that she
was ading ·with due care. Instructions like the one here involved Jlec:essitated rcvc~rsal in the similar cases of Rozzen v.
B7allienfc7d. 117 C'aL\.pp.2c1 285 r255 P.2d 8501; Yc1·lwcgcn
Y. Ouy P. j ikinson Co., 12G Cal.App.2d 442 1272 P.2d 85f5] ;
and Stout Y. Southern Pacific R. R. Oo., 127 Cal.App.2d 491
r:nJ 1'.2(! ]!J-f], 011 tlw g'l'01llld that ihe ('!'l'OllCOUS instrnc•tion
may haYr tipped the seal0 in plaintiff's J'avo1· in the deliberations of' the jne,\', It \vas therefore prejmlir:ial error to give
the in:struetim1.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.,
concurred.
SHENK, ,J., Dissenting.-'l'he question of fact with reference to the negligenee of the defendant and the contributory
ncgligenee of the plaintiff were well within the province of the
jury to determine in this ease. They were both decided in
favor of the plaintiff. Whether it was error to give an instruction based on the presumption provid<'d for in subdivision 4 of seetion 1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and if so \Yhether it "·as reversible error under the doctrine
of Mar Slue Y. Jfary7and Assurance Corp., 190 Cal. 1 [210

Nov.1958]
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P. 269], were adequately considered by the Di;.;trict Court or
Appeal of the Seeond Distriet, Division 1, in an opinion
writtPn by .Tm;tiee I,illie ( 324 P.2d 301). The presumption
is '' i hat a pcrRon tak0R ordinary earc of his own eonecrns. ''
'!'he Mar Shee ease plaees certain limitations, whieh need
not here be discussed, on the applieation of that presumption. 'l'he Distriet Court of: Appeal held that, because of the
incomplete and uncertain testimony of the 83-ycar-old plaintiff
taken some four years after the accident, the limitations of
the Mar Shee case did not apply. It was also held that, considering the evidence and the instructions as a whole, there
was no reversible error. "With this I agree, and adopt the
opinion of the District Court of Appeal as what I believe to be
a just and proper disposition of the appeal. I would affirm the
judgment.
CAR'l'ER, J., Dissenting.-! concur in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of JVI:r. Justice Shenk but
feel that the problem involved deserves further discussion.
Even assuming that instructing the jury on the presumption of due care was error in this case, it was clearly not
prejudicial.
The challenged instrudion reads: "At the outset of this
trial, each party was entitled to the presumption of law that
every person takes ordinary care of his own concerns and that
he obeys the law. These presumptions are a form of prima
facie evidence and will support findings in accordance therewith, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. "'When there
is other evidence that conflicts with such a presumption, it
is the jury's duty to weigh that evidence against the presnmption and any evidence that may support the presumption, to
determine which, if either, preponderates. Such deliberations,
of course, shall be related to, and in accordance with, my
instructions on the burden of proof." (Emphasis added.)
The majority holds that this instruction resulted in prejudice to defendant on the ground that since the evidence on
the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence is susceptible
to an inference either way, the presumption has the effect of
"overemphasizing" plaintiff's case in the minds of the jury,
and thus it might have tipped the scales in plaintiff's favor.
To support its position that overemphasis is a ground for reversable error the majority relies on Butigan v. Yellow Cab
Co .., 49 Ca1.2d 652 [320 P.2d 500). It is submitted that this decision will not support this interpretation.

(St'l'
[:29D P.2d
.)
that 1he j ary
iJJilneneecl one mu:-,t con'iidnt· the
of
:2<1

!.ion is a1so di t·eeted to
or the

with due eat'('. Ho'.\'('Y''r. i
and tlw pn•sm!l
1lw
lhut di'J'e1Hlaui

it

lS

dcfe]}(lant.

that tlle presnmpt ioH
's rlctermi
ion
genee.
Since it call he inferred that U1c
did not consider the
presumption of due care in fayor of defem1ant when COJJsidering the
of defendant
it
lllll'Nl:<Onable
to assnmc that the jury aded any
in its notion
or the presumption when
of
tiff: 's contributory
on tl1is issue \Yas, as on the issue of
rium. Oue is
to conclude, oH the
tlwt a
jury ·will prohab1y aet
in the same case, that the
prcsum ption played little or no JHlrt in thr
determination of plaintiii''s eontribntory neg1igeme.
Unless this court is prepared to say without any affirmative
showing, and eoHtrary io reasonable
that the jury
probably acted im~onsistent1y, it is difficult to perceive, based
on the eyidence herein, precisely how tho
of due
care affected the result, so that without the
the
result would han' he en a He red. Indeed, where the reasona blc
inferenec is that the jm~· has
little m· no f.ffeet to an
erroneous instruction in considering the question of negligence, and i.l1eir subsequent cletermillation o[ the que~tion of
coHtributory nrgligence is consistent with this
inference, a proper c:ondusion i:; that the instruction did not
result in prejudice.
It is obYious that as requisites to such a conclusion the reviewing court must determine the state of the evidence on
the issues of negligcJJee and contributory
as well
as ascertain how the jury utilized the presumption iu regard
to defendant's negligence.
For example, defendant
from a judgment for plaintiff:, contending that it was prejudicial el'roe to instruct the
jury ou the presumption ol:' due care. 'l'he reviewing eourt
determines that the state of the eYidence on the issue of negligence was in near equilibrium but on the issue of eontributory
110gligence it was clear and eonviueing. Examining the jury's
51 C.2d-8

due earc Rinec on evidence in llear f:(J
had to carry the burden of
overcome the preRumption in defendant's favor, which worke(1 to defendant's advantage in this instance. However, on the
conthe
rc1ied
since this could
in the face
eonvineing evidence to
contrary. It may be
inferred,
that the
aetious in
sumption ·were inconsistent and resulted in
'l'hus, it is the affirmative
of the
ineonsistency that establishes prejudice when defendant
\Vithout such a showing there is no reason to bc1ieYc the error
was probably prejudicial.
In cases where plaintiff appeals from a
for defendant on the ground that prejudicial error resulted from
instructing the jury on the presumption of due care, it is
impossible to tell how the jury utilized the
The
jury might have found the defendant
plaintiff contributiYely negligent.. ·under these conditions
error is usually found on the ground that the instructions
tended to confuse or mislead the jury. (See Rozzcn v.
Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [255 P.2d 850]; Slant v.
Smdhern Pacific R. R. Co., 127
4Dl
P.2d
194] .) ]'or this reason the cases cited
the majority for
the proposition that instrm~ting the
on the presumption
or due care constitutes prejudicial error are not in
In
Ro.zzcn v. Blumenfeld, supra, 117
v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., supra, 127
plaintiff was appealing from a judgment for defendant. The
jury could have found for defendant on the alternative
grmwfis of nonnegligenee or plaintiff's
negligence. 'rhus, it is impossible to draw any inferrnce from the
jury's determination of thr vital issues since \Ye cannot be
('C"r-tain on whieh ground the jnry found for dPfendant.
The case of Verlwegen v. GttJJ Ji' .1.ttli:inson
126 Cal.App.
2d 442 [272 P.2d 855], involved an
defendant after
a judgment for plaintiff. An attack on the instruction containing the presumption of due care was upheld. The case is
distinguishable on the ground that there,
was predicated, not on the presumption of due care alone, hut was the
net result of a series of erroneous instructions, of which the
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erroneous made the preapplicable to both plaintiff and
wr>.-T'nv of note that this court has
of such an instruction to be
any circumstances. However, the
have ruled both \Yays on the subinstrnetion on the
of due care identical
~111d fonnd not to be prejndieial
17 Cal.Apn.2d 176, J79 IG1 P.2d
; Sil'oh v.
Cal.App.2d 241, 244-2,15
P.2d
oE due care
It sllould
before held the
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v. Som·es, supra, 17 Cal.
cases appear to have discarded
it ·with the rule that whether such
instruction is
depends upon the facts of the particular ease. 'l'his ad hoc method of deciding prejudice paved
the way for the theory adopted by the majority here. (See
Farcl
Transportation Ca., 101 Cal.App.2d 548,
997]; Razzen v. Blnmenfcld, supm, 117 Cal.
at 288; Stout v. Southern Pacific R. R. Ca., supm,
127
at 497-498; l{unncmakcr v. IIcadlce, supra,
140 Cal.App.2d at 676.) I would disapprove the last cited
cases and hold the instruction here not prejudicial.
For the
reasons it seems clear that no prejudice
resulted to defendant here and the judgment should be affirmed.

